and says that the theology usually called "Arian" should continue to be called that only under three conditions. One must recognize, he writes, firstly, that Arius' own role in the "Arian controversies" was comparatively small; secondly, that fourth-century polemicists made vastly excessive use of the name "Arian" without doing justice to the motives and intentions of those so labeled; and thirdly, that "Arianism" was not merely a conceptual category; it can be understood only in its historical situation.
The term "Arian" seems to have been Athanasius' own coinage and his favored appellation for his opponents (unless he could call them "Ariomaniacs"). Apparently it was only in 341, however, that the Eastern bishops learned that they were being called "Arians." In that year Julius of Rome sent the Eastern bishops a letter that is crucial for understanding how the two opposing parties were formed and defined, and for understanding that the opponents became aware of themselves as parties only around 341 and not earlier.
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In 340 a deputation from the East went to Rome to explain the Easterners' case against Athanasius, Marcellus of Ancyra, and others and to urge Julius to recognize Pistus as the legitimate bishop of Alexandria. Marcellus, Athanasius, and Asclepas of Gaza, all of them deposed, also traveled to Rome, presumably hoping for vindication. Julius took the occasion to summon a synod that would retry the cases of Athanasius and Marcellus and wrote to the Eastern bishops inviting them to attend. The Eastern bishops refused to come, on the ground that the decisions of one council (Tyre, in 335, which had deposed Athanasius) could not be reversed by another. Julius, however, persisted in holding a synod, which upheld the orthodoxy and innocence of Athanasius, Marcellus, and others; and Julius received them into communion. He then wrote the letter already mentioned to the Easterners to explain these actions. In the course of his letter Julius defined and clearly named two opposing parties: they were "the Eusebians" (hoi peri Eusebion) and "the Athanasians" (hoi peri Athanasion). ("Eusebius" was Eusebius of Nicomedia; Eusebius of Caesarea was already dead.) Further, Julius portentously identified the Eusebians as "Arians," and he linked Athanasius' name with Marcellus of Ancyra's, thus implying that there were two opposing parties. The source of Julius' knowledge of the Easterners' dispute was undoubtedly Athanasius and Marcellus. His reason for calling the Eastern bishops Arians, however, was not their doctrine but the fact that The Eastern bishops reacted with shock and indignation at being called "Arians." Meeting in council in the summer of 341 for the dedication of a church in Antioch, they answered Julius' letter. The so-called "First Creed of Antioch" is an excerpt from the letter that the Eastern bishops sent to Julius as an example of the "faith handed down from the beginning." In the sentence that introduces the creed, they express their indignation:
We have not been followers of Arius. For how could we, as bishops, follow a presbyter? Nor did we receive any other faith except the one handed down from the beginning. We ourselves were the testers and examiners of his [i.e., Arius'] faith. We admitted him; we did not follow him. 6 Julius' accusation clearly surprised the Eusebians and cut them to the quick, all the more so because they had decided in Jerusalem in 335 to receive Arius back into communion, and would have done so in Constantinople in 336 had he not died shortly before. 7 Similarly, the theology of those who opposed the "Arians" (to retain the term for the moment) was not explicitly Nicene. The Council of Nicaea did not enjoy any unique authority until several decades after it was held. Writers in the two or three decades after Nicaea make no appeal to its creed as uniquely authoritative or to the term homoousion as a touchstone of orthodoxy. 8 Its greatest influence, curiously, was apparently a negative one: more than a few creeds and authors accepted its anathemas as an adequate definition of the heresy to be rejected and regularly quote them as an assurance of their own orthodoxy.
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Other authors have tried to explain the conflict with the categories "Alexandrian" and "Antiochene." It is true that some of the "Arians" were, or may have been, pupils of Lucían of Antioch, 10 and that some of its adherents lived in Syria. But these terms risk implying an intellectual bridge between Lucian of Antioch and his disciples on the one hand, and the later Christology of Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Nestorius on the other. 11 The roots of dyoprosopic Christology are not in Lucian and the circle around the two Eusebii; if anything, this Christology is foreshadowed in Eustathius of Antioch and Marcellus of Ancyra. Cyril of Alexandria, for the other side, wanted to believe that he drew his terms from Athanasius; but, as is well known, one of his key formulas came from Apollinaris of Laodicea. 12 The relationship between theological speculation in the early fourth century and the Christological controversy of the fifth century is complex and unclear; and to try to interpret the first period by later categories does neither a service.
As a historical phenomenon, it would be most accurate to call the "Arian" theology "Eusebian," understood as a way of thought shared and fostered by Eusebius of Caesarea 
media.
13 All of the elements of this theology are already present in Eusebius of Caesarea's two great apologetic works, the Praeparatio euangelica and the Demonstratio euangelica. The Eusebian theology has been called "Origenist." There is some truth in this, but it may obscure Origen's broad and deep influence on all of Eastern theology. Finally, there is no usable counterpart to the category "Eusebian"; "Athanasian" would be anachronistic.
TWO THEOLOGICAL TRADITIONS
The conflict in the fourth century was one between two theological traditions, both of which were well established by the beginning of the century, but neither of which proved adequate to answer the theological problems raised in the second and third decades of that century.
The crisis of 318 was part of a larger movement: a movement from the rule of faith to theology, from the language of confession to the language of reflection, from belief to speculation on what was believed. The rule of faith and the lex orandi were clear and accepted by all. For centuries Christians had believed in one God, the Father, and in His Son Jesus Christ, and in the Holy Spirit. They had prayed to God the Father through His Son Jesus Christ, their Lord. And they had baptized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Christians of the early fourth century looked at the Christ of the Gospels and saw one who was so much more than a man, and yet not identical with God the Father. Characteristically, the Fathers of the early fourth century can readily quote credal statements, but cannot so readily explain them. Since Origen, no great theologian had come along to explain the faith in the language of reflection and speculation. Furthermore, Christians in the first two decades of the fourth century had had to concern themselves first of all with survival, in the face of what was perhaps the only systematic attempt ever, on the part of the Roman government, to destroy the Christian Church. In many ways the questions brought suddenly to the fore in 318 caught the Church unawares.
There was general agreement on some fundamental theological principles. All Christians were monotheists: there was, and could be, only one God. All Christians rejected psilanthropism: to say that Jesus the Christ was simply a human being, and only a human being, in no way adequately explained him or came close to exhausting his meaning. All Christians agreed that Christ had brought salvation to the human race, Athanasius convoked in Alexandria marked the first time that he admitted that the phrase "three hypostaseis" might be understood of God in an orthodox way, although he still preferred "one hypostasis"
17 Marcellus and the clergy who remained faithful to him wrote to Athanasius ca. 371 and asked him to approve their doctrine. They had given up all of Marcellus' distinctive beliefs but held tenaciously to the doctrine of one divine hypostasis.
18 But the Synod of Alexandria had little immediate effect. Gregory of Nazianzus could still say, ca. 380, that the Westerners suspect Arianism whenever they hear "three hypostaseis"
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Hence the way of using the word hypostasis characterized the two opposing parties for much of the fourth century; one preferred to speak of one hypostasis in God, the other of two (or three, if the Holy Spirit is considered). I suggest calling the two conflicting theological systems "miahypostatic" and "dyohypostatic" theology, the theology of one hypostasis and of two hypostaseis respectively. These terms signal a profound difference in theology, one that touched not only the way GodFather, Son, and Holy Spirit-was understood, but also the way Christ's person and saving work were described.
DYOHYPOSTATIC THEOLOGY

As a coherent system, dyohypostatic theology can be described in a typical or ideal form. No one author mentions all of the following characteristics (although Eusebius of Caesarea comes close). But it is a fair description of a type of theology found in many authors.
There is one God, who is the arche-the beginning, the first principle, the ultimate source, and the cause of everything else that exists. He is eternal and underived, and utterly transcendent, even unknowable, best described by the via negativa: as anarchos (without source), agen(n)êtos (unoriginate or unbegotten), akataléptos (incomprehensible). This God, the Father, and only He, is God in the truest and fullest sense of the word.
Besides the Father, there also exists another hypostasis, which Scripture calls Son, Word, Image, Wisdom, Power, and "the firstborn of all creation" (Col 1:15). The Son of God holds a rank somewhere beneath 17 God but above all creatures, or all other creatures. This tradition does not make any clear distinction between "begetting" and "creating." The decisive point is that the Father is the source of the Son's being; the Son depends on the Father for his being. Collectively, the tradition is wary of materialistic thinking and strives to avoid language that might suggest that the Father's essence is divided to produce the Son, or that the Son is an effluence of, or an emanation from, the Father. The Son's relationship of dependence excludes predicating "eternity" of the Son. He may be said to have been begotten "before all ages," outside of time, since time too is one of the creatures that came to be through him; but if he were truly eternal, he would be a second first principle.
The Son is naturally and obviously subordinate to the Father. Scripture affirms this when it has the Son say, "The Father is greater than I" (Jn 14:28). And reason confirms it, since a first principle or source (arche) is superior to what derives from it. Hence the passages of the Old and New Testaments that imply the Son's subordination to the Father pose no problem for the dyohypostatic tradition.
The Son's principal function is that of a mediator; Scripture calls him the "mediator between God and men" (1 Tim 2:5). As mediator, he is the instrument through which God created the universe: Scripture distinguishes the Father, "from whom are all things," from the Son, "through whom are all things," and says of the Son, "all things were made through him" (1 Cor 8:6; Jn 1:3).
As mediator, the Son is also revealer and teacher. The dyohypostatic tradition often attributes the Old Testament theophanies to the Son: the Son walked in the garden in the cool of the evening, wrestled with Jacob, appeared in the burning bush, gave the law to Moses, and spoke through the prophets. In particular, the Son reveals God because he is "the image of the invisible God" (Col 1:15).
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The incarnate Son is Savior of the human race, principally by fully revealing God the Father, teaching the fulness of truth, and being a model of virtue. He cannot save the human race by divinizing it or uniting it to the divine nature, because he is not divine in the fullest sense of the word. At a moment in history that God determined, the Son took flesh from the Virgin Mary. But the Incarnation was not a radically new state of the Son's existence; the Son was temporarily incarnate when he wrestled with Jacob. 21 The incarnate Christ simply continues his work as revealer, teacher, and model. His human flesh has no new personality or will; the Son in his human flesh continues in perfect harmony of will with the Father, just as he was before he assumed this flesh. His suffering and death on the cross are a model of patience and selflessness.
Put another way, salvation takes place in the order of will; 22 it is not a new state, but an offer of knowledge. The Son reveals the truth and is a model of a God-pleasing life; Christians are saved when they accept the truth and live it. Neither the Incarnation nor the cross and resurrection brought about, of themselves, any ontological change in the human condition. There is no assumption of the human race by the Godhead, no deification of human beings without their co-operation. But with the help of the truth that Christ revealed, and by following his example, the way that leads to salvation can be freely chosen.
The dyohypostatic theology has obvious strengths and weaknesses. It easily accounts for the distinction between the Christ of the Gospels and his divine Father. Further, it offers a good explanation for the many passages in the New Testament that imply the Son's subordination to the Father. Finally, it gives full play to human freedom in the process of salvation.
But this theology also has serious shortcomings. Its chief flaw is its inability to provide a satisfactory account of monotheism. Eusebius of Caesarea's suggestion that the Son is God but not the "only true God" 23 is only the most awkward of the explanations; the others do not differ essentially from it. The dyohypostatic theology cannot avoid positing a second, lower-ranking God. Then too, this theology offers a concept of salvation that is really no more than moralism. 24 The help that Jesus offers is ultimately no more than his teaching and his inspiration.
These authors think habitually, or prereflectively, in terms of the Greek notion of the great chain of being, a way of thinking or conceiving all that exists by situating each existent somewhere on a scale or in an order, with God Himself at the top and brute matter at the bottom. the ease with which some of the Eusebians call the Son "God," while others call him "a creature." The significant point is not the distinction between these two terms, but the fact that the Son ranks below God but above all the rest of creation. This dyohypostatic theology has obvious similarities to Middle Platonic cosmology, especially Numenius'.
26 This is clear also because there is little room for the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is mentioned in the rule of faith, but hardly plays a role in reflection or speculation.
MIAHYPOSTATIC THEOLOGY
The miahypostatic tradition can also be described in a typical or ideal form. The miahypostatic theology takes strict Christian monotheism as its point of departure. There is one God. This one God is one real existent: one hypostasis, one ousia, and (in some authors) one prosöpon.
This one God utters a Word, or begets a Son, and sends forth His Holy Spirit. The miahypostatic tradition does not hesitate to take over these names from the rule of faith, and willingly confesses faith in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. It does, however, at least in its earlier stages, have difficulty explaining, in speculative language, the essence or nature of the Word and the Spirit. It hesitates to assign any plurality to the Godhead, and hence insists on the expression "one hypostasis" In general, in speaking of God, saying "one" is always safe, whereas saying "two" is always dangerous. Plurality is rather located in the Incarnate.
The Son, for the miahypostatic tradition, is God in the same way that the Father is: homoousion tô patri, although its representatives seldom appeal to the Creed of Nicaea until several decades after the Council.
The Incarnation is the decisive moment in the history of salvation and marks a new stage in the history of the Logos. At the Incarnation God Himself is united with a human nature and thereby with human nature itself. This tradition conceives of human nature as a collectivity, so that, when the Word assumed ho anthröpos, he also assumed-and thereby elevated-hé anthrôpotës.
The miahypostatic theology applied to the incarnate Christ, or even to Christ's flesh, all the biblical texts that suggested the Son's subordination to the Father. It is the Incarnate, as man, who says, "The Father is greater than I" (Jn 14:28), or who knows neither the day nor the hour (Mk 13:32). In principle, at least, this gave these authors an opportunity 26 to reflect on Christ's human soul or mind. 27 Salvation, in this tradition, is essentially a divine act by which the human race is elevated and deified. Salvation takes place in the order of being: God acts, and thereby the human race is saved. Athanasius expressed this in his famous axiom, "God became man so that man might become divine."
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Marcellus of Ancyra 29 held a distinctive form of the miahypostatic theology, and several points distinguish his thought from the general outline just sketched. He propounded a radical monotheism. God is one ousia, one hypostasis, and one prosôpon. Ousia and hypostasis mean "being" or "existent." Prosôpon means "source of action," and especially of rational discourse. The term that Marcellus preferred for God was the third, prosôpon. God had to be one prosôpon, because Marcellus could not conceive of two "I"s in the Godhead; hypostasis means the reality behind the prosôpon.
The Word, as God's dynamis or power, is eternal; when God speaks, then His Word became an active power. The only title that is proper to the Preincarnate is "Word"; all other titles are titles of the incarnate Christ. The Word "goes forth" from the Father; "begetting" is better reserved for the Virgin's conceiving. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and receives His mission through the Son.
God's activity appears to expand the monas or unity into a triad; but the monas is indivisible in dynamis, that is, indivisible into two or three distinct subjects; and the nature of the expansion is left unexplained, except that it is in energeia mone.
When Marcellus writes abstractly of Christ's humanity, he calls it sarx; but when he thinks of it functionally or soteriologically, he calls it anthröpos.
When writing of the Savior's work (and "Savior" is the title he prefers for the Incarnate), he does not distinguish between Christ's human nature and human nature in general and thus grounds his doctrine of deification. Marcellus taught that when the Word assumed ho anthröpos, it assumed not only an individual man but the whole human race, and the latter precisely as sinful and deceived.
Marcellus also sees the need for a human soul or mind in Christ. Asterius had explained that Jn 10:30 ("I and the Father are one") signified their "perfect harmony of will in every word and deed." But Marcellus points out that Mt 26:39 ("not as I will, but as you will") demonstrates that their wills were not always in harmony; hence Christ had a distinct center of consciousness.
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With careful attention to 1 Cor 15:24-28, Marcellus teaches that Christ's partial kingdom will, at the end of time, be absorbed into God's whole kingdom. 31 Even when he wrote the Contra Asterium, however, he admitted a problem with this theory, namely, his inability to explain what would happen to Christ's flesh at the consummation of time.
Manuals often take Marcellus' doctrine of God as a Monad that temporarily expands into a Triad as the most typical element of his theology. But these terms are not frequent in the extant fragments of the Contra Asterium. Marcellus' speculation is rather dominated by a full and emphatic account of Christian monotheism but lacks a term, or a place, for the hypostatic existence of the (preincarnate) Word and the
Spirit. He can call God a Triad but cannot say what is triadic in God.
On the other hand, he distinguished clearly between the preincarnate Word and the incarnate Christ, and had the rudiments of a Christology that gives an adequate place to Christ's complete human nature.
At least potentially, the miahypostatic tradition recognizes that the first and most important distinction among existents is that between the uncreated and the created. The uncreated is divine and eternal, the created is finite and temporal. No series of steps, no great chain of being, can bridge the gap between God and creatures. The only possible bridge is a free act of God's, the act of creating. Further, while both the Word and creatures have their source in God, the way they proceed from the source is radically different. The Son is begotten, that is, he comes from God's essence. Creatures are made; they come from God's will.
THE TWO TRADITIONS COMPARED
When the two traditions are compared, their strengths and weaknesses, measured against the later, orthodox resolution, become clear. 30 Frag. 73. Grillmeier (Christ in Christian Tradition 285-86) writes: "We can hardly be wrong in seeing the assertion of 'two wills' in Christ as a contrast to the Arian doctrine of the mutable will of the Logos which marks him out as a creature This is a new step of Marcellus in Christology This already seems to introduce a Word-man Christology." See also frag. 74, in which Marcellus also attributes disharmony of will to the flesh that the Word assumed. 31 See J. T. Lienhard, "The Exegesis of 1 Cor 15, 24-28 from Marcellus of Ancyra to Theodoret of Cyrus," VC 37 (1983) 340-59. three divine ousiai. 40 But the most significant partisan was probably Asterius the Sophist. 41 Before Nicaea, Asterius wrote a booklet (syntagmation) which became the theological manual of the Eusebian party and qualified Asterius to be the spokesman or publicist of dyohypostatic theology. In this pamphlet Asterius defined "ingenerate" precisely as "what was not made, but always is." He also speaks of a double power and a double wisdom: one natural to God and hence eternal, unoriginate, and unbegotten, and another, manifested in Christ, which is created. Asterius states more clearly than the others that Christ is the necessary, created instrument by which God created.
Speaking of one hypostasis makes the defense of Christian monotheism easy, but allows little room for an explanation of the Trinity that sees plurality in the Godhead itself and not simply in God
Arius too, far from being an original thinker, was simply one more adherent of the dyohypostatic tradition, 42 albeit one who, in his earlier statements in Alexandria, expressed himself awkwardly or provocatively, and who, further, had the bad luck of using the language of dyohypostatic theology in an atmosphere-Alexandria-where it was unfamiliar and hence easily misunderstood.
In this early period the miahypostatic tradition is sparsely represented; dating Athanasius' Contra gentes et de incarnatione uerbi before 318 has been abandoned by most scholars. 43 The second period is that from Nicaea to the Dedication Council of Antioch. After Nicaea the language used by the representatives of the dyohypostatic tradition is more guarded; phrases like "two Gods" and "two ousiai" disappear. Asterius the Sophist wrote his letter 44 But the dyohypostatic theology continued, apart from the formation of parties and the decrees of synods. In the two decades after the Dedication Council, this theology has two characteristics: it sees Marcellus of Ancyra, in a more and more stereotyped picture, as the opponent par excellence; and it becomes increasingly moderate and nuanced, so that one of its last forms is the homoeousian theology proposed around 358.
Eusebius of Caesarea died in 339, and Acacius succeeded him. Acacius wrote a work against Marcellus, probably soon after 341; in the extant fragments he is much concerned with the title "image" for the Son, and heavily dependent on the second creed of Antioch. 48 The sermons of Eusebius of Emesa (ca. 300-ca. 359), 49 which are preserved in a Latin translation, show a theology that is also a later form of the dyohypostatic theology. Eusebius insists with equal vigor both on the deity of the Son and on his subordination to the Father. Piet Smulders shows that Eusebius has the beginnings of a dyoprosopic Christology, which he is led to by his reflection on Jesus' agony in the garden and his suffering on the cross. 50 Eustathius of Antioch and Marcellus of Ancyra had already suggested that Jesus' human will had to be considered; in Eusebius of Emesa a representative of the dyohypostatic theology comes to the same insight. The one "heretic" whom Eusebius of Emesa attacks with any emotion is Marcellus of Ancyra. 51 Smulders writes of him that "the person of Eusebius leads us to the heart of the homoeousian group." 
